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1 Introduction
The EU was never more prominent in Greece than during the economic
crisis that began in 2008 and made the Greek polity, policies, and poli-
tics a topic of heated debate in the national parliaments and media of all
other EU member states.1 In early 2010, the Greek government successfully
negotiated a mechanism that would provide rescue packages to ailing EU
member-state economies to guarantee the financial stability of the Eurozone;
and Greece became the first country to request the bilateral International
Monetary Fund (IMF)-EU package (Gemenis 2010b, Tsarouhas 2012). The
response of the Greek public seemed paradoxical, revealing a plurality that
rejected the bailout agreement but which, at the same time, was in favor of
remaining in the Eurozone (Tsebelis 2012). This seeming paradox can be
understood by looking at the context in which attitudes toward European
integration are formed in Greece—which can be understood as a struggle
between pro-EU modernizers and adherents to what Diamandouros (1993)
calls the “underdog culture” who, among other things, lament the loss of
sovereignty to the EU.
Until the mid-1990s, it was customary to portray Greece as an awkward
European partner. Greece after all, joined the European Communityi in
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1981, as a newly consolidated democracy. The populist and Eurosceptic dis-
course of the socialist governments of the 1980s (Verney 1993), the nationalist
position over the issue of the neighboring republic’s name during the early
1990s, and Greece’s support of Slobodan Milosevic during the Yugoslav wars
soon after, did much to reinforce this image (Papadimitriou 1998). Arguably,
the election of Costas Simitis as prime minister in 1996 heralded a new era
for Greece (Tsoukalis 1999, Verney 1997). A politician who was never at
ease with his party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Simitis
was elected to implement a “modernization” program, which would bring the
country closer to its European partners (Lyrintzis 2005). In fact, by the late
1990s, Europe was hardly a divisive issue in Greek politics, and this is when
the boom in the literature on the “Europeanization of Greece” began. Pub-
lic opinion had changed from an initial Eurosceptic stance into being over-
whelmingly in favor of deeper European integration. In addition, although
the salience of the EU has “oscillated between indifference and feverish de-
bates” (Nezi, Sotiropoulos & Toka 2010), with the exception of the Commu-
nist Party of Greece, the opposition lacked parties that mobilized against the
EU (Dimitras 1992, Verney 2011). Perhaps, this Euro-euphoria reached its
peak during the 2003 Greek presidency of the Council, which is widely con-
sidered as highly successful (Bunse 2004, Dimitrakopoulos & Passas 2004).
When these developments were viewed in contrast to other European coun-
tries, which were at the time experiencing the transition from a permissive
consensus to a constraining dissensus in their European policy (Hooghe &
Marks 2008), Greece stood out positively (Deflem & Pampel 1996). But
was this increasingly positive stance vis-a`-vis the EU accompanied by Eu-
ropeanization understood as domestic change? This is the puzzle that the
current crisis brought to the forefront.
The monitoring of the Greek economy by representatives of the IMF, the
European Central Bank (ECB), and the European Commission brought to
the surface many pathologies of the Greek administration which, in conjunc-
tion with the well-known structural constraints in Greek politics (Featherstone
2005a, Featherstone 2011), hamper the prospects of domestic change through
Europeanization. Despite its 30-year EU membership, Greece proved to be a
weak state rather than “a giant in the making” (Kalaitzidis 2009). In effect,
these recent developments cast doubt on the claim that Greece had become
Europeanized, or was at least in the process of becoming so. What went
wrong? In this chapter, we seek answers to this question. Our narrative
of Greece’s Europeanization is twofold: We review existing works and con-
textualize this evidence in the current picture of Greece’s relations with the
EU. We contend that key to grasping Greece’s Europeanization process is
an understanding of the role played by major actors, namely Greek politi-
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cal elites and party organizations, especially those alternating in government
that acted as managers of the state. In short, the Greek case provides us
with a powerful reminder that party politics, a challenging (and neglected)
area of Europeanization research, matters greatly.
The chapter is structured as follows: We begin by sketching out our
conceptual and methodological considerations in section two and, in sections
three to five, we critically review the literature regarding the EU’s impact
on national policies, institutions, and politics respectively. In section six, we
draw on a synthesis of insights gained from this research to discuss current
developments in Greece and its relationship with Europe.
2 Conceptual and methodological considera-
tions
Europeanization is here understood as “an incremental process reorienting
the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and eco-
nomic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics
and policy making” (Ladrech 1994, 71–72) or simply as “the process of re-
shaping national politics as a result of policies and preferences advanced
through the EU level of governance” (Bache & Jordan 2006, 30). Ioakimidis
(2000, 74) distinguishes between “responsive” and “intended” Europeaniza-
tion, where the former is an interactive process “between the national polit-
ical system . . . and the EU system,” while the latter is understood as “mod-
ernization” in which domestic actors simply respond to challenges emanating
from the top. Since Greece largely fits to the “intended” type of Euro-
peanization Ioakimidis (2000), our approach is “top-down” in that it focuses
“on the dimensions, mechanisms and outcomes by which European processes
and institutions affect domestic-level processes and institutions” (Bo¨rzel &
Risse 2007, 485). More specifically, we view the emergence of policies and
institutions at the EU level as the independent variable, the outcome of
Europeanization as the dependent variable, and the degree of misfit, along
with the preferences and positions of national actors and institutions, as
intervening variables. Linking back to the conceptual discussion in chap-
ter 1, our perspective is similar to that of Radaelli (2002, 127–130), who
mapped domestic factors as intervening variables in explaining the process
of Europeanization.2 However, we acknowledge the possibility of interactions
between the intervening variables, as well as the possibility of the outcome
2For the role of advocacy coalitions, veto players and legitimating policy discourse in
Greece see Featherstone (2005a), Featherstone (2011), Ladi (2005) and Tsarouhas (2012).
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being dependent on factors unrelated to European integration.
Unfortunately, the methodological issues surrounding causality are rarely
discussed explicitly in the Europeanization literature (Radaelli 2012). As
Exadaktylos & Radaelli (2009, 510) note, the most prominent theoretical
frameworks lack exogenous variables affecting the outcome that could act as
controls. Should we assume that these exogenous variables do not exist, or
accept that some of the explanations might be spurious? If it is possible
to attribute the cause of the outcome to a factor exogenous to European
integration, could we argue that it is European integration that is causing
the outcome? Establishing causality (Dunning 2008), improving case study
analysis (Haverland 2006, Gerring & McDermott 2007), the significance of
process tracing (Gerring 2007, 172–185), or counterfactual reasoning (Gerring
& McDermott 2007, 172–185) are analytical problems to be borne in mind
and are further considered in chapter 15.
Here, the following three sections review most of the published literature
on the Europeanization of Greece. When possible, we separate studies fo-
cusing on different policies from studies focusing on institutions and politics,
outline their conclusions regarding the outcome of Europeanization, and ad-
dress the ways in which researchers use theoretical frameworks, empirical
evidence, and methods to infer the impact of Europeanization.3
3 Policy
We begin with the impact of European integration on national policiesby far
the most analyzed dimension of Europeanization in Greece and elsewhere
(Featherstone 2003).
Starting with citizenship and minorities policy, Pollis (1992) looks at the
way Greece adheres to and respects European norms and values. She sees
EU membership as exerting pressure on Greece “to abandon its claimed dis-
tinctiveness” (Pollis 1992, 176) and adopts a research design that compares
policies surrounding freedom of religion in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. She
shows that some policies in Greece are restricting religious freedom and spec-
ulates EU membership might facilitate the transformation of these policies.
Similarly, Anagnostou (2005) sees policy misfit in the case of a policy that
stipulated that individuals who are not ethnically Greek (for example Jews,
Muslim Albanians, or Slavic speakers) and who left the country without the
intention of returning (communists during the Civil War) could be deprived
of citizenship. Using interviews with political leaders, experts, and officials,
3Note, however, that in some cases the conceptual foundations or the methodology
followed is not made explicit.
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Anagnostou (2005, 347–350) concluded that the revocation of this policy was
the result of rising awareness among political elites and experts that respect-
ing human rights “enhanced the country’s standing abroad.” Fisher Onar
& O¨zgu¨nes¸ (2010) also investigate the Europeanization of minority policy
by comparing Greece to Turkey. They found that, despite the fact that the
application of “carrots and sticks” for Turkey was associated with condition-
ality to enter the EU, Greece experienced a greater transformation of its
minorities policy—an outcome best explained by the degree of national elite
willingness to reform.
With regards to immigration, Mavrodi (2007) argued that EU member-
ship has had a liberalizing effect on Greek policy. She argued that EU mem-
bership facilitates the spillover of immigration policies from old immigration
countries (such as France and the UK) to new immigration countries such
as Greece. By studying parliamentary debates about the adoption of im-
migration bills between 1991 and 2005, she found a significant EU impact
both in terms of formal obligations under the Schengen system and volun-
tary adjustment. She then addressed the counterfactual question, “what if”
Greece was not an EU member, discussing the impact of public opinion and
domestic institutional factors (NGOs, trade unions). By using material such
as Eurobarometer opinion polls and interviews, she was able to illustrate that
the particular changes in immigration laws cannot be attributed to domestic
factors (Mavrodi 2007, 167–170).
Turning to environmental policy, Kazakos (1999) sought to explain the
impact of the EU by considering different mechanisms such as international
agreements, EU legislation, financing by the Community support frame-
works, and “learning” via exposure to policy networks. Although environ-
mental policy is one of the hard policy areas in the EU, he concluded that
the outcome of Europeanization is largely determined by actors at the na-
tional level. Thus, he argued that EU “legislation is often not implemented
due to the absence of effective controls, the lack of political will and ad-
ministrative inadequacy, in a climate not favoring environmental protection”
(Kazakos 1999, 384). Europeanization of environmental policy was also ex-
plored by Ladi (2007) who adopted an analytical framework based on policy
misfit, as outlined in chapter 1. Using participant observation and focus
groups with members of the Ministry for Environment, Physical Planning
and Public Works, the European Commission and environmental nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), she found that the outcome of Europeaniza-
tion is a matter of interpretation. Assuming that environmental policy has
not been a priority for the Greek government, the counterfactual argument
goes that any convergence to EU standards should be attributed to the im-
pact of the EU and any divergence to the penetration of interests at the
5
national level.
With regards to social policy, Sotiropoulos (2004) investigated the im-
pact of the EU by differentiating between changes in policies and changes
in policy-making. To do so, he contrasted factors emanating from the EU
with domestic explanations such as the nature of political culture, organi-
zational deficiencies in public administration, and the interests of different
social groups. By using a longitudinal design based on welfare state in-
dicators, he finds little substantive change in policy outcomes. Whatever
changes were observed concerned policymaking and were concentrated in spe-
cific areas such as employment, vocational training, childcare, and pensions.
Sotiropoulos’ emphasis on institutional legacies hindering reform is affirmed
by Featherstone’s (2005b) study of the pension system, which assesses reform
as “slow” and “modest” despite both national stimuli and EU pressures re-
lated to the fiscal constraints on government budgets set up by EMU. Due
to the powerful domestic constraints, this author questions Greece’s ability
to remain in the EU’s core (Featherstone 2005b, 747–748). A further, empir-
ical study examining Greek response to evolving EU social policy over time
complements this picture: “The state-centered society and the bad public
administration constrain the economic and social modernization processes,
toughen problem solving, restrict initiatives, and negatively affect policy ef-
fectiveness overall” (Sakellaropoulos 2007, 220). It is worth noting, here, that
comparative research on compliance with EU social policy directives classifies
Greece (together with France and Portugal) in the “world of neglect”: This
is a category of countries where bureaucratic inertia and apolitical transposi-
tion processes are related to a poor compliance culture in both political and
administrative systems (Falkner, Treib & Hartlapp 2005, 317–341). This has
often led the Commission to bring Greece to the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) and involves enormous waste of resources in paying ECJ-imposed
fines for failure to comply with policy directives that Greek governments
themselves agreed upon at the EU level (Falkner 2011).
Finally, a highly researched policy area with regards to Europeanization in
Greece is foreign policy. This is surprising given that it is widely considered as
the last bastion of national sovereignty (Ladrech 2010, 190–191). Economides
(2005), who researched the impact of CFSP on Greek foreign policy, argues
that Greece’s membership in the EU diffused specific values, norms, and
practices in policy-making at the national level. The author claims that
the style of Greek foreign policy has become more Europeanized and that,
at the same time, Greece was able to upload its “foreign policy preferences
and interests in at least two key issue areas, Turkey and Cyprus, onto the
EU agenda” (Economides 2005, 472–473). Similarly, based on a review of the
literature and interviews with researchers Tsardanidis & Stavridis (2005, 224)
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conclude that “all agree that there has been a successful Europeanization of
Greek foreign policy.” Yet, such an enthusiastic conclusion might simply
reflect experts’ wishful thinking. This might, in turn, emanate from their
close relationship with actual policy developmentsand perhaps, also, political
parties (Ladi 2005).
4 Institutions
With regards to the Europeanization of institutions in Greece, Spanou (1998)
studies the EU impact on administrative systems. Focusing especially on how
the Greek state institutions deal with the implementation of EU policies,
she argues that various extra-institutional, informal processes related to the
interaction between state-society and politics-administration moderate the
responses of the Greek system to EU challenges. Also, she argues that the
gap between formal rules and informal practices may favor or inhibit respon-
siveness. These findings complement the research on the Europeanization of
policy mentioned above.
Most research in this field has focused on the impact of the EU on the in-
stitutions relating to the territorial organization of the country. Paraskevopou-
los (1998, 39) researched the case of EU regional policy as an adaptational
pressure “for the structure of the state and the system of public administra-
tion.” Using network analysis based on interviews with prominent regional
actors, he sought to explain the differences in institutional building and adap-
tation. The findings suggest that, although European integration provided
a “positive external shock,” the outcomes reflected interaction between EU-
level variables and preexisting differences in the institutional capacities of the
Greek regions. Similarly, Getimis & Grigoriadou (2004, 6–7) see EU mem-
bership as a political and economic opportunity structure that interacts with
the different political structures of member states. In a comparative study
of municipalities in the wider Athens metropolitan area, they use semistruc-
tured interviews to investigate “the influence of EU policies and their fund-
ing requirements on partnership formation and on the emergence of patterns
of civic participation in the process of urban policy-making” (Getimis &
Grigoriadou 2004, 14). Their findings suggest an EU impact on partnership
formation and community involvement in specific projects, but the outcomes
are largely defined by factors relating to party politics, sectoral interests, and
clientelistic networks.
That said, Giannakourou (2005) finds European Spatial Development
Perspective (ESDP) and other EU-led planning instruments to have gen-
erated important changes in domestic patterns of spatial planning systems.
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These changes, she argues, are not the product of forced compliance to EU
models but occur through complex socialization and learning processes that
expose domestic actors to new ideas, practices, and methods and induce cul-
tural innovation. This assessment is made based on a comparison of the EU
planning policies impact on five Mediterranean states (France, Greece Italy,
Portugal, and Spain).
One of the most important EU policies for Greece, and other countries
of the periphery such as Ireland and Portugal, has been the cohesion pol-
icy, through which the Commission targeted the territorial organization of
member states, seeking to strengthen the regions vis-a`-vis the central gov-
ernments. Andreou (2006) uses a historical institutionalist lens to examine
the implementation of this policy in Greece. He suggests that “EU influence
did not manifest itself principally in the field of territorial relations, but in
the domain of policy objectives, policy style and practices” (Andreou 2006,
253). In particular, he found that adaptational pressures are usually accom-
modated in ways that do not challenge centrally controlled (by the executive)
structures. For example, the creation of NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics) regions to absorb EU funds “did not involve institu-
tional reform, but the patching of new policies and institutions onto existing
oneswithout changing the latter” (Andreou 2006, 253).
Finally, we turn to two prominent institutions: the government and par-
liament. Featherstone (1998) argues that, where discretion is available to the
Greek government, policy-making tends to advantage small circles of actors
within the core executive. Hence, one of the impacts of EU membership is
that the already centralized Greek executive was furthered strengthened in
relation to other domestic actors such as the parliament. Dimitrakopoulos
(2001) assessed the parliament’s response to the challenges of EU membership
by focusing on its formal structure and goals. The author adopted a com-
parative framework, where the Greek parliament was compared to those in
France and the UK, but was unable to draw a clear, causal Europeanization
effect. Although it was argued that developments in national parliaments
followed “developments at the level of the EU, thus underlining the reac-
tive approach” (Dimitrakopoulos 2001, 406), the absence of controls at the
national level suggest that the observed relationship might be spurious. Sim-
ilarly, Zervakis & Yannis (2001) chart post-accession changes in the Greek
parliament. Although they do not use a Europeanization framework, they
argue that the most visible impact of European integration was the establish-
ment of the committee for European affairs in June 1990, due to a motion
by the European Parliament stressing the need for such committees in all
member states.
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5 Politics
As pointed out by Featherstone (2003), Hix & Goetz (2000) and others, the
impact of European integration on the politics dimension is the least studied
area in Europeanization research. In the Greek case, although political par-
ties are mentioned in analyses of policy reform, and of Europeanization of
policy, as powerful actors in the process, there are very few studies that an-
alyze political parties in this context. Starting with national party systems,
Mair (2000) famously argued that the EUs impact in terms of party system
format and mechanics is practically nonexistent. Lyrintzis, in his 2005 re-
view of the cultural and political context within which Greek parties operate,
did not explicitly discuss the impact of European integration. As Greece did
not experience the creation of new parties that mobilized solely on the is-
sue of EU membership, we could concur with Mair (2000) on the absence
of Europeanization effects in the Greek party system. The May and June
2012 elections, however, offer some evidence to the contrary. In the two-year
period prior to the signing of the bailout agreement, the two parties al-
ternating in government—PASOK and New Democracy (ND)—experienced
fissures because of the austerity measures and loss of sovereignty associated
with the agreement. Consequently, the Greek party system witnessed the
highest number of parliamentary parties since 1974. The most visible of the
new parties that mobilized against the bailout agreement is “Independent
Greeks” (led by a former ND deputy) which gained about 10 percent of the
vote in the May election. The Independent Greeks do not mobilize against
the EU as such, but against the policy measures associated with membership.
Given this, as well as the recent volatility of the Greek electorate, we cannot
conclude yet that the EU has had a significant impact on the Greek party
system.
Turning to individual political parties, Ladrech (2002, 396–400) identified
four possible areas of potential EU impact: policy content, party organiza-
tion, patterns of party competition, party-government relations, and relations
beyond the national party system. To provide for a theoretical mechanism
that would explain the differential impact of the EU on parties, Lefkofridi
(2009b, 2009a) links the party Europeanization literature with classic theo-
ries of party change and behavior. Seeking to explain national parties’ (lack
of) change in a constantly changing EU environment, she focuses on how
the EU impacts party goals (votes, office, and policy). More specifically,
she argues that the extent to which the EU environment may trigger party
change, and the kind of the change induced, are conditioned by party-related
variables, namely their goals, and by intraparty constellations of power and
organizational structures.
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Her empirical exploration (Lefkofridi 2009b), based on qualitative anal-
ysis of party manifestos, semistructured interviews, and archival sources,
examines the role of Europe in party discourse, as well as in policy and orga-
nizational change. An important insight gained by this research is that, while
parties do not change positions on the EU and its policies over time, they
change the way they refer to the EU by using it instrumentally in their dis-
course, insofar as it fits their vote-maximization strategy (Lefkofridi 2010).
She traces the EU impact on Greek parties’ structural evolution, changes
of the selection procedures for important party posts (leadership, MPs, and
MEPs), the creation of committees, and so forth through time (Lefkofridi
2009b, Lefkofridi 2010). The results suggest that, with the exception of the
coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN), Greek political parties have not
realized the need to adapt their organization for the purpose of pursuing
policy in a multilevel context. The two major parties opted for using the
state’s structure or hiring external experts. However, in the context of a ma-
jor restructuring induced by electoral defeat, PASOK made some EU-related
changes (for example upgrade of MEPs and new rules for coordination be-
tween MPs and MEPs).
The impact on policy and programmatic content was partially addressed
by Gemenis (2010b), who used PASOK as an illustrative case in his cross-
national comparison. Focusing on environmental policy positions and follow-
ing a process-tracing approach using official party documents, he concluded
that there was little in the environmental discourse of the party that can
be attributed to the impact of the EU. The only evidence supporting the
Europeanization hypothesis was PASOK’s adoption of the “sustainable de-
velopment” concept between 1993 and 2000 (Gemenis 2010a, 187–189).
With regard to party competition, Greek political parties were studied in
the context of a comparative analysis of six EU member states by Lefkofridi
& Kritzinger (2008), who explored the context of European political compe-
tition and on which grounds national parties compete in EP elections. They
assessed party awareness of the EU context by looking at how present/absent
this was in the electoral debate by distinguishing between policy areas where
the EU has competence and those policies for which it does not. The analysis
is based on data collected by the Euromanifestos Project (1999–2004). Their
findings suggest that awareness can be observed to varying degrees amongst
political parties: Greek parties, like most parties examined, have become
increasingly aware of the European context in which they operate, but in
terms of action induced (for instance concerning the way they structure their
competition in the political space) the impact of the EU is minimal.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
Looking at Greek policy, institutions, and politics, we could say that the ev-
idence for EU impact looks thin. Apart from speculative assessments (Pollis
1992), and the overly positive assessment on the Europeanization of foreign
policy, most researchers stress the importance of variables at the national
level which may be independent of EU pressures (Anagnostou 2005, Gemenis
2010a, Fisher Onar & O¨zgu¨nes¸ 2010, Sotiropoulos 2004). This is also evi-
dent in the area of political parties, where we observe great resilience despite
a changing EU environment (Gemenis 2010a, Lefkofridi 2009b, Lefkofridi &
Kritzinger 2008). Moreover, as adaptational pressures also emanate from
agreements at the international level, it is difficult to distinguish the effect of
Europeanization from that of globalization (Ladi 2007). For many authors, it
was “not easy to assess which factor is more or less important in determining
public policy in Greece” (Kazakos 1999, 377). This not surprising consider-
ing that, in many studies, the bulk of empirical evidence was inadequate to
give the necessary leverage for causal inference.
When methodological considerations of establishing causality are taken
into account, it seems that, apart from policy harmonization in areas related
to the internal market, the strongest evidence for change in Greece emanating
from the EU concerns immigration policies, where the EU was shown to have
had a liberalizing effect (Mavrodi 2007). Mavrodi’s contrasting findings in
assessing two different potential sources of Europeanization (Mavrodi 2007,
Mavrodi 2008) and Ladrech’s (2010, 30–31) note that researchers should
consider the important distinction between “hard” and “soft” EU policies
when investigating the EU impact reminds us that the degree of adaptational
pressures is an important factor in determining Europeanization outcomes.
Hard policies require member states to implement the relevant EU legislation,
whereas soft policies are those which merely create opportunity structures
for change at the national level. Whether domestic actors will seize them
depends on the domestic institutional and political context. Illuminating
in this regard are Ladi’s (2005) observations on the role played by experts
in Greek policy reform and Nezi, Sotiropoulos, and Toka’s (2010) findings
about the identity of national parliamentarians and their attitude to the EU
in comparison to the Greek public. Ladi (2005, 293–294) extends the policy
advocacy coalition framework by emphasizing political, economic, and social
interests and the way they form belief systems and shows that the links
between such coalitions and political parties are crucial for the successful
outcome of the experts’ efforts toward modernization. In the study by Nezi,
Sotiropoulos & Toka (2010), the public proved to be more ethnocentric than
MPs with regard to the appropriate level where policy should be formulated
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whereas MPs were positive toward delegation of policy competences to the
EU level. However, these scholars also found that political elites did not
think about Europe on its own terms but that their views Europe depended
on political ideology and party affiliation.
The critical assessment of the literature in this chapter echoes Haverland
(2007, 65–66) in that research strategies matter for our understanding of
Europeanization. Our review shows that, despite 30-year long membership
in supranational institutions, the Greek polity, policy, and politics have seen
little change that could be unambiguously attributed to the EU. How does
this picture connect to the current political and economic events in Greece
and Europe?
Due to lack of Europeanization, or put more mildly, due to a superficial
Europeanization at the policy, institutional, and party level, Greece could
not live up to the expectations of the single market and especially EMU.
This is not to say that non-Europeanization “caused” the sovereign debt
crisis. But if Greece had been Europeanized: (a) it would not be so ill-
prepared for dealing with the crisis (b) it would be more credible and EU
partners would not be as reluctant to support Greece as they were at the
beginning of the crisis. Here it is worth mentioning that much depends upon
the political elites’ will to push change forward (Tsarouhas 2012). Despite the
fact that the country was on the brink of economic collapse, political parties
failed to reach consensus and form coalition governments prepared to pursue
necessary policy change. On the contrary, they kept on acting based on
self-interest and vote-optimizing tactics. But as Greece was found in a state
of Greece’s complete dependency on EU partners’ credible commitments, its
own credibility as a reliable partner was increasingly shaken. The crisis forces
debate about the pros and cons of European integration for Greece and the
duties that accompany the rights of EU membership that Greek political
elites are unable to conductperhaps because they were the ones that most
forcefully resisted change.
Consequently, to turn this empirical conclusion to a normative one, we
could say that the impact of Europeanization in Greece has been limited. To
the (Euro)skeptics, who tend to attribute to the EU many of the ills facing
the country today, we offer the evidence summarized in this chapterthat it
was mostly domestic factors shaping the policy, institutions, and politics in
Greece. We therefore suggest consideration of the counterfactual situation:
What would Greece look like if there had been a significant impact of the
EU and the Greek polity and politics had not been marred by administra-
tive deficiencies and clientelistic/particularistic (as opposed to public policy-
oriented) parties? The domestically and internationally discredited Greek
political elites, who for decades mismanaged the state, as well as Greek and
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EU resources, are now called to save the country from a severe economic but
also deeply political and social crisis to which their behavior contributed. We
contend that to “Europeanize” Greece, Greek elites need to change the way
they think about Europe, and to adapt their organizations so as to pursue
policy in a multilevel, transnational environment.
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